INTRODUCTION

Some Background
IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT SITUATION, the agent chooses an action "on behalf of" the principal. The resulting consequence depends on a random state of the environment as well as on the agent's action. After observing the consequence, the principal makes a payment to the agent according to a pre-announced reward function, which depends directly only on the observed consequence. This last restriction expresses the fact that the principal cannot directly observe the agent's action, nor can the principal observe the information on which the agent bases his action. This situation is one of the simplest examples of decentralized decisionmaking in which the interests of the decision-makers do not coincide. 2 If this action-reward situation occurs only once, I shall call it a short-run principal-agent relationship. The situation can be naturally modeled as a two-move game, in which the principal first announces a reward function to the agent, and then the agent chooses an action (or decision function if he has prior information about the environment).
The Nash (or perfect Nash) equilibria of such a game are typically inefficient (unless the agent is neutral towards risk), in the sense that there will typically be another (but nonequilibrium) reward-decision pair that yields higher expected utilities to both players.
In order to increase the efficiency of short-run equilibria, the principal could monitor (at least ex post) the information and decision of the agent. However such monitoring would tyically be costly, so that net efficiency need not be increased by monitoring.
Another approach to increasing efficiency is suggested by the theory of repeated games. If a game with two or more players is repeated, the resulting situation can be modeled naturally as a game ("supergame") in which the players' actions in any one repetition are allowed to depend on the history of the previous repetitions. In the principal-agent situation, the repetition of the game would l I am grateful to R. A. Aumann, R. W. Rosenthal, and A. Rubinstein for helpful discussions of the topic of this paper, and to A. Rubinstein, J. Mirrlees, and the referees for comments on a previous draft. The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of AT&T Bell Laboratories. 2 The references relevant to the Introduction are gathered in the Bibliographic Notes in Section 9. 1173
give the principal an opportunity to observe the results of the agent's actions over a number of periods, and use some statistical test to infer whether or not the agent was choosing the appropriate actions. The repetition of the game would also provide the principal with opportunities to "punish" the agent for apparent departures from the appropriate actions. Thus, roughly speaking, the principal could employ the analogue of a "statistical quality control chart" to deter "cheating" by the agent. However, since the accumulation of reliable statistical evidence takes time, the threat of future punishment would be a less effective deterrent the more the agent discounts future utility. A formal analysis suggested by the preceding intuitive ideas is carried out in the present paper, for the case in which the game is repeated infinitely often. I shall show that the less the players discount future utility the closer they can approach efficiency with equilibria of the supergame. These equilibria can all be achieved by a family of relatively simple strategy-pairs that I shall call review strategies. Roughly speaking, in a review strategy the principal periodically evaluates the cumulative performance of the agent since the last review. If a review results in a satisfactory evaluation, a new review phase is begun; if not, the players enter a penalty phase, after which a new review phase is begun. During each entire review phase the principal pays the agent according to the target efficient reward function. During the penalty phases the players revert to the short-run equilibrium. A particular review strategy is characterized by the lengths of the review and penalty phases, and by the criterion for satisfactory performance at the times of review.
I should emphasize that, by definition, the equilibrium strategy pairs are self-enforcing, and thus do not rely on any binding contracts or other precommitments. In particular, the agent induces the principal to follow an equilibrium review strategy by threatening to initiate a phase of myopic optimization (short-run equilibrium) following any departure by the principal from the target reward function during a review phase. Without such a threat, the principal might be tempted to shorten a particular review phase if, for example, the agent had already attained a very high cumulative performance and hence could safely "coast" to the end of the current review phase with minimal effort.
Summary of the Main Results
Let u* and v* be the one-period expected utilities of the principal and agent, respectively, corresponding to an inefficient short-term equilibrium, and let u and v^ be respective one-period expected utilities corresponding to an efficient reward-decision pair that is more efficient than the short-run equilibrium (i.e. u > u* and > v*); such an improvement will always exist in the present model. Let y and 8 be the players' respective discount factors; then for every E > 0 there will exist y, and 8, less than 1 such that for each (y, 8) with y y, and 8 > 86 there exists an equilibrium of the corresponding supergame that yields the players' (normalized) discounted expected utilities at least u -E and v -e, respectively. Inrparticular, there will be critical discount factors above which there exist supergame equilibria that are strictly more efficient than (u*, v*).
In the remainder of this introductory section I shall discuss some aspects of these results more fully, before proceeding to a more formal presentation and analysis of the model. For this discussion, however, some minimum of formal notation will be helpful. To simplify the exposition, suppose for the time being that both players have the same discount factor, say 8 (0 -8 < 1). If, for a given pair of supergame strategies, the principal's expected utility in period t is ut, then his normalized discounted expected utility for the supergame is defined to be u=(l-8)E ` Ut; t=1 a corresponding formula defines the agent's supergame payoff, say v. For each 8, let W(8) denote the set of pairs (u, v) of normalized discounted expected utilities of the players corresponding to equilibria of the supergame. Let W denote the set of efficient one-period expected utility pairs. The first main result of the paper can be paraphrased as follows: for every pair (u, v) in W that is superior to (u*, v*), i.e., u> u* and v>v*, one can get arbitrarily close to (u, v) with points in W(8), by taking 8 sufficiently close to 1. In addition, an explicit construction of such "approximately efficient" supergame equilibrium strategies is given, namely the "review strategies" described above.
Multiplicity of Equilibria of the Supergame
For every pair of the players' discount factors, the corresponding supergame equilibrium is not unique, provided the discount factors are not too small. For example, the pair of supergame strategies in which each player stubbornly sticks to his short-term-equilibrium strategy is a supergame equilibrium, whatever the players' discount factors. Thus, for each 8, (u*, v*) is in W(8). In addition, there will be many equilibria in review strategies, as described above. Indeed, it can be shown that for sufficiently large discount factors the set of equilibria has the cardinality of the continuum. Following standard terminology, I shall call the mapping from 8 to W(8) the equilibrium utility correspondence.
For a fixed discount factor 8, a utility-pair in W(8) is called second-best-efficient if there is no other utility-pair in W(8) that is at least as large in each coordinate and strictly larger in one. It would be of interest to characterize such second-bestefficient utility-pairs and the associated supergame equilibrium strategies, but I have not attempted to do so in this paper. It does not appear that the review strategies alluded to above are second-best-efficient, even though they are approximately efficient (and therefore approximately second-best-efficient) for discount factors close to unity. This point is discussed more fully in Section 8.
The Case of No Discounting
It is natural to try to define a "limit supergame" as the discount factor 8 which is well-defined and finite for every bounded sequence (ut), and define the agent's supergame payoff analogously. It can be shown (see Section 9) that, for the case 8 = 1, the corresponding set W( 1) of supergame equilibria contains every efficient pair in W that is superior to a short-run equilibrium pair (u*, v*). In other words, if the players do not discount the future at all, then they can attain exact efficiency with supergame equilibria. On the other hand, there will also be inefficient supergame equilibrium payoff pairs, e.g., (u*, v*).
A Continuity Property
Taking the two preceding results together, we see that the equilibrium payoff correspondence W(-) has a continuity-like property, with respect to efficient payoff pairs, at 8= 1. This property of the repeated principal-agent game is apparently not shared by more general repeated games under uncertainty (see Bibliographic Notes, Section 9). Because of this ability to exploit long-term relationships to increase efficiency, the principal-agent mechanism may be particularly important in decentralized organizations. The implications of this for organization theory will be explored elsewhere.3 1.6. Outline of the Paper Section 2 defines the one-period principal-agent game and reviews those of its properties that are relevant to the present paper. Section 3 defines the repeated game, and Section 4 desribes a family of review strategies for the repeated game. In Section 5 the discounted expected utilities of such strategies are derived. In Section 6, as a preparation for the first main result on equilibria, I derive information about the agent's optimal response to a review strategy of the principal; in particular I derive lower bounds on the players' expected utilities corresponding to such an optimal response by the agent. Section 7 gives the main result on equilibria for the discounting case, and in particular shows that the principal's optimal response to a review strategy is itself a review strategy.
To make the exposition less abstract and thus appeal to the reader's imagination, the argument in Sections 2-7 is developed entirely in the context of a simple example in which the agent's action is a level of "effort," the stochastic consequence of the agent's action is either success or failure, and the principal is neutral towards risk. The extension of the argument to a more general model is sketched in Section 8 and in the Appendix.
References to the related literature, as well as other bibliographic notes, are gathered in Section 9.
2. THE ONE-PERIOD GAME I shall start with a description of the one-period game. First, the principal announces a reward function, cw, which is a pair of numbers (wo, wl). Second, the agent chooses an action, a, which is a real number. Third, there is a consequence, which is a random variable taking on the values 1 ("success") or 0 ("failure"); the probability of success is an increasing function of the agent's action. Finally, the agent receives a monetary reward, w, or Wo, according as the consequence of his action is success (C = 1) or failure (C =0); the principal receives the remainder, C -We. Without loss of generality, one can take the agent's action to be the probability of success, i.e. It is typically realistic to impose two constraints on the rewards. The first constraint is that the principal may not impose arbitrarily large penalities on the agents; in other words, the rewards are constrained so that the agent's disutility is bounded from below. The second constraint expresses the condition that the agent is free to refuse to enter into the relationship (i.e., to play the game). For this, the rewards Wo and w, must be such as to enable the agent to achieve some minimum expected utility. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to impose a constraint of the first type; the addition of the second constraint would slightly complicate the exposition, but would not change the results in any essential way. To express the first constraint, one can assume that the rewards are bounded below (and that the function P is finite everywhere); without loss of generality I assume that they are nonnegative:
Co-(wo, wI) 0.
Note that it has been assumed that the principal is neutral towards risk, whereas the agent is averse to risk.
In this game, the principal's pure strategy is the reward function, co, and the agent's pure strategy is a mapping, a, from reward functions to actions: a = a(@v).
An equilibrium of the game is a pair of strategies, (co*, a*), such that (i) co* maximizes the principal's expected utility, u = EU, given that the agent uses a*, and (ii) a*(co*) maximizes the agent's expected utility, v = EV, given co*. In this paper I shall consider only perfect equilibria, in which, for every co (not just co*), a*(cv) is an optimal action for the agent given cw. Thus "equilibrium" is henceforth to be understood here as "perfect equilibrium." (See Section 8.3.)
It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to give a complete analysis of the one-period game. However, an understanding of a few aspects of the game will clarify the main issues that are addressed in subsequent sections.4 Given the reward function co, if the agent chooses the action a his expected utility will be In summary, we shall be concerned with an equilibrium (o*, a*) of the one-period game that is inefficient, and for which there is no Pareto-superior equilibrium. Since (o*, a*) is not efficient, it follows from the structure of the one-period game that there is a pair (o, a) that is efficient and is strictly better than (o*, a*) for both players. Thus let u and v be the respective one-period expected utilities yielded by (6o, a); then u> u* and v> v*.
THE REPEATED GAME
I shall now describe the infinitely-repeated game, or supergame. Roughly speaking, during each period the principal and agent play a one-period game, with a new random environment each time. Each period each player's action can depend on what he has observed up to that point in time, his information history. For the principal, this is the history of his own previous actions (i.e., announced reward-pairs), and the history of previous successes and failures. For the agent this is the history of his own and the principal's previous actions, the history of previous successes and failures, and the reward-pair that the principal has just announced. Neither player ever observes the random environments, which are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. At the end of each period, after having observed the current success or failure, the principal compensates the agent according to the reward-pair that he announced at the beginning of the period. A supergame strategy for a player is a sequence of decision-rules that determine his action at each period as a function of his information history at that point of time. The supergame payoff for a player is the normalized sum of his discounted expected one-period utilities.
Here is a more formal definition of the supergame. For t = 1, 2,..., ad inf., let Ot, be the reward function announced by the principal at the beginning of period t, let A, be the action chosen by the agent in period t, let C, be the corresponding realized consequence, and let Wt = wt(Ct) be the agent's reward. Define, for t 1, where (w*, a*) is the (inefficient) equilibrium of the one-period game that was described in Section 2. The discounted expected utilities yielded by this equilibrium are u* and v*. I shall say that the agent optimizes myopically during any period in which he uses a*.
REVIEW STRATEGIES
As in Section 2, let (w*, a*) be associated with an equilibrium of the one-period game, yielding one-period expected utilities u* and v* to the principal and agent respectively, and let (co, d) be an efficient pair in the one-period game, with co = (w', w'), yielding respective one-period expected utilities ui and v. Furthermore, suppose that (co, d) is more efficient than (co*, a*), so that u > u* and v > v*. I shall now describe a class of sequential strategy pairs, (a, r), from which equilibrium strategy-pairs in the supergame will be constructed; these strategy-pairs will be called review strategies. (I emphasize that the review-strategies that I construct will be equilibria in the space of all strategy-pairs, not just in the space of review strategies.)
Recall Roughly speaking, a review strategy for the principal pays the agent the reward w during periods 1 through R, whatever the agent's performance during this time, and then reviews the agent's cumulated performance, SR. If SR is large enough (the agent "passes the review"), then the process is repeated. If SR is too small (the agent "fails the review"), then the principal uses the one-period equilibrium reward function co* for M periods, where M is a number to be determined; after period (R + M) the process is repeated. Passing the review is defined by the condition SR , Ra-B, where a is the agent's efficient action, and B is also a (positive) parameter yet to be determined. The quantity q = Ra -B may be interpreted as the agent's quota of successes during the review phase. Notice that if the agent were to use the action a in each period, then the expected number of successes in R periods would be Ra, so that B can be interpreted as the "margin of error" in cumulated performance that is allowed by the principal at the time of review. Thus the principal's review strategy is determined by the parameters R (the length of a review phase), B (the allowable margin of error at review), and M (the length of the "penalty phase"). Notice that the "penalty" consists in reverting to short-run noncooperative behavior for some length of time, so a better term might be "noncooperative" phase.
If (5, i) is to be an equilibrium pair of strategies in the supergame, with C a review strategy, then (by definition of equilibrium) i must be optimal for the agent given v. In particular, it is clear that it will be optimal for the agent to optimize myopically (see Section 3) against the reward function during each period of a penalty phase, since the agent cannot influence the principal's one-period strategies during the remainder of the penalty phase. Section 6 provides further information about the agent's optimal response to v.
In 
OPTIMAL REVIEW STRATEGIES FOR THE AGENT
In this section I derive some useful information about the agent's optimal response to a review strategy of the principal. In particular, I derive lower bounds on both players' expected utilities corresponding to such an optimal response by the agent. These preliminary results have an independent interest in the case in which the principal can make a binding commitment to follow an announced review strategy, although this case is not explicitly treated in the present paper (however see Section 9).
For any specification of R, B, and M, the agent will choose the strategy r to maximize (5.3); call the resulting maximum v(8). This optimization problem can be formulated as a standard dynamic program with a finite set of states,5 and the existence of a stationary optimal strategy can be demonstrated by standard techniques. However, we shall need here only a few properties of the optimal strategy.
Notice that the agent has only to decide what to do during the review phase. One strategy that is available to the agent is to use the "efficient" action a throughout the review phase; call this the "good faith" strategy and denote it by The conclusion of the lemma now follows from (6.26) and Lemma 6.1.
EQUILIBRIUM REVIEW STRATEGIES
In this section I give the main results on equilibria for the case of discounting, namely, that efficiency can be approached with equilibria of the supergame as the players' discount factors approach unity, and such equilibria can be attained with review strategies. These results are stated formally in Theorems 7.1 and 7.2. An immediate corollary is that for all discount factors above some critical values there are equilibria in review strategies that yield the principal and agent discounted expected utilities strictly greater than u* and v*, respectively. Finally, the agent's review strategy is specified to be optimal against the principal's review strategy, and satisfy (4.4). Thus we can adequately denote the principal's review strategy by o-(R, M') and the agent's review strategy by r(5, R, M'), which represents a natural change of notation from that of Section 3. As in Section 4, let i7(y, 6, R) and v(8, R) denote the corresponding discounted expected utilities of the principal and agent, respectively. Since it is part of the definition of r(8, R, M') that it be optimal against o-(R, M'), in order to show that a particular pair is an equilibrium it is sufficient to show that o-(R, M') is optimal against r(6, R, M'). Sufficient conditions for this will be given in this section.
Recall that a pair of review strategies, (a, r), is characterized by the parameters R, B, M, and M' (see Section 3). The relationships among R, B, and
By (4.1) and (4.2), if the principal departs from the constant reward c = (w, w) during a review phase, then this action-which I shall call stopping-initiates a penalty phase. By (4.4), the agent optimizes myopically against o, during a penalty phase, so that it is optimal for the principal to set to = o* during a penalty phase; hence the second line of (4.3). Hence to show that o-(R, M') is optimal against r(6, R, M') it is sufficient to show that the principal should not stop during a review phase.
For the time being, let u(y) denote the principal's maximum discounted expected utility against r(8, R, M'), and Ht = Hc. If the principal stops just after period t < R during the first review phase, and then follows an optimal policy thereafter, his discounted conditional expected utility after period t, given H,, will be (7.1)
(1 -y R-t+M') *+ R-t+M'(y).
If the principal continues without stopping from t to the end of the first review phase and follows an optimal policy thereafter, his discounted conditional expected utility after period t, given H,, will be By the optimality principle of dynamic programming, u(y) is at least as large as the maximum of (7.1) and (7.2), so a sufficient condition for o-(R, M') to be optimal is that (7.1) be less than (7.2) for each t = 0,..., R -1.
A feasible strategy for the principal is to use co, = co* for all t; hence u(y) u*.
Also, in (7.2), Hence a sufficient condition for o-(R, M') to be an equilibrium is that (7.1) be strictly less than (7.4), or equivalently,
7R-t(yM _ yM'(Y)u yR)(( +)-U*)>)(+U),
for t=O,...,
R-1.
Since u(y) , u*, this is equivalent to Let us first investigate the second line of (7.5). For this it is sufficient that uo(y)> u*, where uo(y) is defined in (6.25b) ; see the proof of Lemma 6.2. By (6.26), for given 8 
I -ey
For every R and 8 satisfying (7.6), this last inequality is in turn satisfied for y sufficiently close to 1, since, by (6.26), the limit of Z(y) exists and is positive as y tends to 1.
To summarize the analysis of (7.5), for each 8 The second main result concerns the existence of equilibria in review strategies that are arbitrarily close to efficient for discount factors sufficiently close to unity. Note that (7.7) is only needed to assure that the principal's review strategy is optimal against the agent's review strategy, but the discounted expected utilities of the players do not depend on M'. On the other hand, the assumption that the successive random environments are independent and identically distributed plays an important role in the present analysis of the supergame, which could not be carried through in general if the agent observed a random event at the beginning of the supergame, and this random event remained payoff-relevant throughout the supergame.
A precise description of the more general model is given in the Appendix.
Review-Strategy Equilibria Are Not Second-Best
I have not attempted here to characterize those supergame equilibria that are most efficient within the set of equilibria that are attainable with fixed discount factors. It does not appear that the equilibria described in Section 7 are in fact efficient in this second-best sense. For these equilibria, the agent has a quota of successes to fulfill in each review phase, namely q = Ra -B. Once the agent has fulfilled his quota, he has no incentive to put in any effort during the remainder of the review phase. On the other hand, if the agent is too far from the quota at some point in the review phase (i.e., St + R -t < q), then he also has no incentive to put in any effort during the remainder of the review phase.
To induce the agent to over-fulfill his quota, the principal could share with him the proceeds from successes over and above the quota. Thus, if St = q, then the agent might receive Wn = wi +fCn, for n = t + 1, . . ., R, where f is a number between 0 and 1. To induce the agent not to "give up" after unfavorable experience, the length of the penalty phase could be made an increasing function of the amount by which the agent falls short of the quota, e.g., M = mo+ mI(q -SR), where mo and ml are positive parameters. These modifications would appear to increase efficiency, but it is not known to me whether they are sufficient to actually attain second-best efficiency.
Precommitment by the Principal
In the one-period game studied here, the principal moves first by announcing a reward function, which he is committed to use at the end of the period. In the corresponding supergame, these commitments last one period at a time, and the principal cannot bind himself in advance to a sequence of two or more reward functions. A variation of this game would have the principal move second, and announce (and pay) the reward after observing the consequence of the agent's action. In the one-period game it would, of course, be optimal for the principal to pay the agent nothing, but in the supergame the situation would be analogous to the one studied here. The important aspect of the problem studied here, which is common to the two variations, is that neither player can make binding commitments to follow any particular sequence of one-period strategies.
One could also consider a variation of the supergame in which the principal can enter into a binding commitment to follow his pre-announced supergame strategy. In this case the principal would choose a supergame strategy that is best for him, given that the agent would optimize against it. Since the reviewstrategy equilibria studied here are not second-best efficient, the optimal supergame strategy for the principal would not be a review strategy. On the other hand, Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 would still be valid for the agent's optimal responses to review strategies of the principal, and so optimal equilibria of the supergame with precommitment by the principal would also be approximately first-best efficient for discount factors close to unity.
Credible Equilibria
It is known that one must typically impose some further restriction on Nash equilibria of sequential games in order to assure that they will be "credible," i.e., that any threats that are implicit in the players' strategies are credible. Space limitations allow me only a few remarks here for the already initiated reader. For recent discussions, see [8, 9] .
One such restriction is sub-game perfectness. The criterion of subgame-perfectness in the supergame has not been formally invoked here because, strictly speaking, there are typically no proper subgames after the principal's first move. This is implied by the fact that the principal can never observe the agent's actions directly, and if A, is never 0 nor 1 then all finite sequences of consequences have positive probability. Nevertheless, both the agent and the principal can immediately detect any departure from a pre-announced strategy of the principal. An alternative concept of "credible equilibrium" that seems useful in this situation, called sequential equilibrium, has been proposed by Kreps and Wilson [9] . In fact, one can show that the review-strategy equilibria constructed in Sections 4-7 satisfy their definition.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES
In the case of a one-period game, Groves [ [24] .
The properties of the set of supergame equilibrium payoff vectors are wellunderstood for the case of repeated games under certainty in which (i) the players can monitor the actions of the other players after each one-period game ("perfect monitoring") and (ii) the players do not discount their future utilities ("no discounting"). In this case, the set of supergame equilibrium payoff vectors is the same as the set of feasible, individually rational payoff vectors in the oneperiod game. (This is the so-called Folk Theorem.) The same conclusion can be derived for perfect equilibria of the supergame; this deeper result is due to Aumann and Shapley (unpublished) and to A. Rubinstein; see [20] for references and a related result. The case of perfect monitoring with discounting has not been so well explored; see Kurz [10] and Lockwood [11] .
Unfortunately, the condition of perfect monitoring is ruled out by the informational structure of the principal-agent situation (without additional cost, as noted above). I am not aware of any previous treatment of the infinite principal-agent supergame with discounting. For the case of no discounting, Radner [13] has shown that for sufficiently long but finite principal-agent supergames one can sustain approximate efficiency by means of approximate equilibria. Particular infinite principal-agent supergames have been analyzed in a similar spirit, again for the no-discounting case, by Rubinstein [19] and by Rubinstein and Yaari [21] . However, the strategies used for the no-discounting case in the above-cited literature do not appear to be applicable to the case of discounting.
The use of review strategies permits a more-or-less unified treatment of the two cases; for the no-discounting case one can construct equilibria with review strategies in which the review periods are progressively longer. Furthermore, the use of review strategies permits a more elementary mathematical analysis. For a full treatment of the no-discounting case, see Radner [16] .
As mentioned in Section 1.5, the continuity-like property of the equilibrium payoff correspondence at efficient payoff-pairs, as the players' discount factors approach unity, is apparently not a general property of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. An example is provided by repeated partnership games (Radner [14] ), for which there are fully efficient supergame equilibria without discounting, whereas in the case of discounting the set of supergame equilibrium payoff vectors may be bounded away from efficiency uniformly in the players' discountfactors, provided these are strictly less than unity (see Radner 
